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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11. The state alleged that the

defendant had driven under the influence with an excessive breath alcohol content.
The defendant moved to suppress the results of a breath test on the basis of a violation of
the constitution's prohibition on warrantless searches, but the Magistrate Court found that the
defendant's consent, provided after being told the consequences of a refusal, was not invalid.
At a later motions hearing, the defendant moved to have an ex parte hearing before an ex
parte judge in order to request funds and the Court granted an ex parte hearing but denied the
request for an expert, finding that an expert whose task would be to impeach the breath testing
machine in the case was not essential.
Finally, the defendant then moved for the breath test result to be excluded at trial because
the state was in violation of LC. § 18-8004(4) but the Court found that the ruling in Besaw
controlled and that the newest changes did not mean that the Standard Operating Procedures
were incapable of rendering accurate results. The Court also found there was nothing wrong
with the way the standards were adopted, seemingly relying on Besaw for that ruling as well.
The defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty while reserving his right to appeal
the Court's rulings and the Court found him guilty. He timely appealed.
The District Court in its appellate capacity heard argument and reviewed the briefing of
the parties. The District Court upheld the rulings of the Magistrate. The defendant timely
- 1-

appealed.
B.

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts
On July 6, 2013, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence with an

excessive breath alcohol content (BAC) by Trooper Keys of the Idaho State Police. On
September 10, 2013, the Magistrate Court heard the defendant's Motion to Suppress. The
defendant and the state also stipulated to the entry of an Administrative License Suspension
form. The defendant argued that the advisory form with its warnings taken from LC. § 18-8002
were coercive and that his consent to the breath test was involuntary. The Court found the
consequences enumerated in the advisory did not amount to a type of threat or coercion that
would make consent involuntary. Tr. p. 9, L. 19-23.
On October 16, 2013, the Magistrate Court heard part of the defendant's Motion in
Limine. The Court took judicial notice of the Standard Operating Procedures for administering
breath testing as they existed at the time of the case. Tr. p. 30, L. 2-4. The Court heard
testimony from Corporal Lind of the Idaho State Police. Tr. p. 21. The Corporal testified that
when the breath tests were administered, the first two tests were not within .02 of each other, and
a third test was performed. Tr. p. 24, L. 1-16. He further testified that each time he waited two
minutes between breaths. Tr. p. 27, L. 3-21.
Jeremy Johnston then testified. Tr. p. 30. Mr. Johnston indicated his training and
experienced. Tr. p. 30-34. When he was asked for his opinion as to the normalcy of having to
have a third test on the Lifeloc FC20, the defense objected due to noncompliance with the
discovery rules and a lack of foundation as to his training and experience. Tr. p. 35-38. The
-2-

objection was overruled. Tr. p. 38. Mr. Johnston testified that if two samples are not within .02
of one another they are outside the matching parameter. Tr. p. 40, L. 21-23. Mr. Johnston then
testified that an additional fifteen minute waiting period after a .02 discrepancy occurred should
only happen if the officer involved suspects mouth alcohol. Tr. p. 41. Mr. Johnston then offered
his own speculation as to how the original error occurred. Tr. p. 42. Mr. Johnston admitted he
had no idea what the defendant's actual breath alcohol ratio was. Tr. p. 47, L. 5-6.
On cross examination, Mr. Johnston testified that the machine measures a particular point
in time in a breath sample. Tr. p. 43, L. 3-15. Mr. Johnston then testified that a person cannot
produce a result higher than their actual blood alcohol ratio. Tr. p. 44, L. 6-10. He testified that a
third sample, in a case with a .02 discrepancy, is necessary to show the result is accurate. Tr. p.
44, L. 22-25. He then testified that in this case, where the samples were .256, .233, and .235, the
defendant must have had either radio interference, mouth alcohol, or inconsistent sample
delivery to have produced the .256 sample. Tr. p. 46, L. 12-15. He then testified it could not
have been radio interference because the instrument was shielded against that, though he then
testified he had not inspected it for issues. Tr. p. 46, L. 16-18, p. 53, L. 14-24. He testified that
the fifteen minute observation period (ironically, the same one he had determined was
unnecessary when he changed the SOPs in January, 2013) made him certain mouth alcohol was
not the issue. Tr. p. 46, L. 19-21. He testified that the .256 sample was falsely high because it
was not consistent with the other two samples, and yet, correctly high in terms of actual BAC.
Tr. p. 47-48. He testified that the alcohol curve should not have changed appreciably during the
time the tests were being delivered. Tr. p. 48, L. 17-20. He testified that the machine has an auto
-3-
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procedure to ensure it is getting "deep lung air" but once it is met, a person can provide

a lower BAC than what they actually have. Tr. p. 13-22. He testified that he had never seen a
situation where a person provided consistent but incorrect samples because of mouth alcohol
affecting only one of the samples and the other sample being not as deep, stating that "normally"
mouth alcohol saturates the instrument and exceeds what it can measure. Tr. p. 52, 7-16. And,
after all, there is that fifteen minute observation period. Tr. p. 52, L. 16-17.
The defendant then moved for the results of the breath tests to be excluded on the basis of
the fact that the samples were not taken in a manner that ensured reliability, the Standard
Operating Procedures used by the Idaho State Police for officers to do breath testing were not
adopted in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Act, and because the Standard Operating
Procedures no longer guaranteed accuracy due to removing the fifteen minute waiting period and
the ISP' s history of putting the goal of conviction over scientific accuracy. (Much of the
argument was made later on December 18, 2013.) Tr. p. 56-58, 68-76. The Court denied the
motion, not finding any discrepancy in the SOPs and following the Court of Appeal's opinion in

Besaw. Tr. p. 78-81.
The defendant then had an ex parte hearing before the judge and requested an money to
hire an expert on the mechanics and weaknesses of the Lifeloc FC20. Redacted Tr. p. 2. The
Court denied the motion, finding that an expert whose task would be to impeach the machine
was not essential, even if you had to pay them to learn those weaknesses, and certainly not to
have them testify. Tr. p. 10-11.

-4-

The defendant entered a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11. The defendant timely filed a
notice of appeal under I.C.R. 54. l(a), et.seq. from the judgment of the Court.
The District Court accepted briefing from the parties and held oral argument on October
1, 2014. The Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Dismissing Appeal on October 2,
2014. The District Court upheld the lower court's findings. The District Court specifically
found that the decision whether to provide funding for an expert to an indigent defendant is
within the discretion of the trial court. The District Court went on to find that the Magistrate had
acted within his discretion. The District Court also found that Besaw did control the question of
whether the Idaho State Police had properly promulgated a method for breath testing pursuant to
LC. § 18-8004(4). The District Court also held that the Idaho State Police were not required to
follow the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act to promulgate the standards for breath testing as
the standards were a burden on law enforcement but not with the force and effect oflaw. Lastly,
the Court found that while implied consent was revocable, there was nothing constitutionally
unsound in threatening and imposing fines and a loss of a driver's license for revoking it.
The defendant timely appealed.

-5-

ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether an appellate court reviewing a denial of assistance to an indigent
defendant should utilize the abuse of discretion standard.

II.

Whether the Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth Amendments require the defendant be
allowed an expert with the requisite experience and learning to mount a defense
against the state's use of the LifeLoc FC20 to prove his breath alcohol content.

III.

Whether the Idaho State Police have properly promulgated rules for the
administration of breath testing.

IV.

Whether the Idaho State Police have promulgated rules that ensure accuracy as
required by LC.§ 18-8002A and LC.§ 18-8004(4).

V.

Whether State v. Besaw, 306 P.3d. 219 (Idaho Ct.App.2013), is manifestly wrong
and should be overruled.

VI.

Whether the Administrative License Suspension advisory coerces and invalidates
the defendant's consent to providing a breath sample under the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

-6-

ARGUMENT

I.
A. Introduction
The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's denial the defendant's request for
funding for an expert on the weaknesses of the Lifeloc FC20. The District Court held that the
denial should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Thus, the Court upheld the
Magistrate's findings that an impeachment witness was not an essential witness. The
Magistrate's finding was not that the jury would not find such testimony helpful, but merely that
unless the witness could provide affirmative evidence indicating innocence, his testimony and
assistance were non-essential. This ruling flies in the face of fairness and the adversary nature of
the trial.
B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997). The District
Court, relying on State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391 (1982), held that the appellate court should utilize
an abuse of discretion standard.
Significantly, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) was decided after Olin. Idaho's
Supreme Court has yet to acknowledge the ruling, despite deciding State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho
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53 (2003),

its wake. The Court of Appeals has held that Ake is controlling precedent. State v.

Martin, 146 Idaho 357 (Ct.App.2008).
The ruling in Martin is significant in that Ake was found to control, but because the Court
of Appeals merely looked to the standard for determining whether an indigent defendant should
receive assistance, it did not set a standard ofreview. Martin, 146 Idaho at 363. The Court of
Appeals had no reason to recognize that the Supreme Court in Ake did not utilize an abuse of
discretion standard. Rather, the Supreme Court directly reviewed the record and the applicable
law. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87.
Moreover, the abuse of discretion standard does not make sense within the Ake
framework. The trial court is to determine whether the issue the assistance is requested for is a
substantial factor. The Supreme Court determined that a psychiatrist is appropriate in cases of
mental illness. See id. at 82. It did so by determining the probable value of the assistance sought.
Id. at 79. The Court found:
In this role, psychiatrists gather facts, through professional examination,
interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze
the information gathered and from it draw plausible conclusions about the
defendant's mental condition, and about the effects of any disorder on behavior;
and they offer opinions about how the defendant's mental condition might have
affected his behavior at the time in question. They know the probative questions
to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers.
Unlike lay witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe might be
relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychiatrists can identify the "elusive and
often deceptive" symptoms of insanity, Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12
(1950), and tell the jury why their observations are relevant. Further, where
permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can translate a medical diagnosis into
language that will assist the trier of fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form
that has meaning for the task at hand. Through this process of investigation,
interpretation, and testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist lay jurors, who generally
-8-

have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and educated
determination about the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the
offense.

Id. at 80. To say that each trial judge needs to determine at their discretion whether, as here, the
breath testing machine is a significant factor in a DUI case involving a breath test, or whether an
expert who can gather facts about the machine and expose its weaknesses, is absurd. The
question, as will be discussed below, is simply whether those two arguments ring true. They do.
C.

The Constitution and Idaho law requires that an indigent defendant be able to put on a
defense, and where the state chooses to rely on machinery, the defendant must be
afforded an expert on that machine.
The defendant has a right to Due Process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment,

which embodies a "standard of 'fundamental fairness."' Olin, 103 Idaho at 394 quoting Watson

v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297,298 (10th Cir. 1966); State v. Lee, 221 Kan. 109 (1976). "[S]tate(s)
must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an
adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners." Britt v.

North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,227 (1971); see also IDAHO CONST. Article I§§ 1, 13, 18; LC.§
19-852(a)(2). "It is equally evident that if a defendant is denied access to the basic tools of an
adequate defense, then he has also been denied his due process right of a fair trial." Olin, l 03
Idaho at 394 citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 585 (1956). "A defendant's request for expert or
investigative services should be reviewed in light of all circumstances and be measured against
the standard of "fundamental fairness" embodied in the due process clause." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53 (2003) citing Olin, 103 Idaho at 391.
The court must determine whether the defendant can meet the standard set by the Idaho
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Court of Appeals in Martin. That Court held that:
a defendant seeking assistance at state expense must make a threshold showing
that the assistance has probable value to address what will be a significant factor
at trial, such that the accuracy of the jury's determination would be called into
question if the assistance were denied.

146 Idaho at 363 citing Ake, 470 U.S. at 74. The defendant in this case stands to lose his liberty
because the state will be able to produce a machine and an expert to vouch for its accuracy and
he in turn can produce nothing to show that said machine is fallible. The defendant cannot afford
to pay for an expert as their testimony generally costs multiple thousands of dollars.
Therefore, the county is required to absorb the cost of the defendant's witness:
In Argersinger the [United States Supreme] Court rejected arguments that social
cost or a lack of available lawyers militated against its holding, in some part
because it thought these arguments were factually incorrect. But they were
rejected in much larger part because of the Court's conclusion that incarceration
was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a criminal
trial unless an indigent defendant had been offered appointed counsel to assist in
his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such a rule.

Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979) citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n. 7
(1972). The defendant may not be tried without a fair process, regardless of its cost. See,

generally, Scott, 440 U.S.; Hamlin, 407 U.S.; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17-18. As the Supreme
Court wrote in Griffin:
[s]urely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal Government could
constitutionally provide that defendants unable to pay court costs in advance
should be denied the right to plead not guilty or to defend themselves in court.
Such a law would make the constitutional promise of a fair trial a worthless thing.
Notice, the right to be heard, and the right to counsel would under such
circumstances be meaningless promises to the poor. In criminal trials a State can
- 10 -

no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or
color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a
defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a
defendant of a fair trial. Indeed, a provision in the Constitution of Illinois of 1818
provided that every person in Illinois 'ought to obtain right and justice freely, and
without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay, conformably to the laws. (footnotes omitted).

Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17-18.
In this case, the Magistrate found that the Comi was not required to pay for an expert if
his testimony was merely meant to impeach the state's evidence. Such a rule has never been
pronounced by an appellate court of this state and has no basis in the law. It is not as if the
defendant can produce the very air he was breathing at the time of the incident so that it may be
retested. And regardless, the salient issue is that the state will rely on a machine and a man
claiming expert status to prove that the defendant's BAC was .2 or above. Showing that the
machine and the expert are untrustworthy is essentially the only issue at trial. See State v.

Hunter, --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 1777986 at *4 (Idaho App.,2014) (holding that since all the state
must prove is .08 BAC or above, evidence of impairment is irrelevant).
In the analogous situation where identification of the defendant is proven by DNA but the
blood sample is lost, no Court would hold that not only may the blood be used but because the
defendant cannot now study the sample and say to what extent it is inaccurate, he may not
challenge its value as proof of his identity save by way of cross examination of the state's expert.
The vast majority of jurisdictions have found the opposite. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932); Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980); A·fason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d
1345, 1351 (9th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Coiner, 356 F.Supp. 695 (N.D.W.Va.1973); United States v.
- 11 -

Germany,

F.R.D. 421 (M.D.Ala.1963). If the state chooses to pursue a case in which some

scientific or mechanical method is to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, then it is
only basic, fundamental fairness that requires the defendant be able to challenge that method
with an expert with the training and experience to reveal the flaws in the evidence against him.
This Court must so find.

II.
A.

Introduction
The Magistrate Court erred in not granting the defendant's Motion in Limine to exclude

the breath testing. The Magistrate erred in finding that a violation of l.C. § 18-8004(4) would
prevent the admission of breath test results because the statute requires that a method exist that
ensures an extremely reliable result for the testing of breath for alcohol. The District Court relied
on the ruling in Besaw and further found that Standard Operating Procedures do not have the
force and effect of law. This Court should either overrule Besaw or find it is not controlling on
the issues raised herein, and should further find that the Standard Operating Procedures, in order
to be used as the foundational requirements for evidence, must be promulgated pursuant to
IDAPA.

B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Button, 134 Idaho 814;

Powell, 130 Idaho at 125.
C.

LC.§ 18-8004(4) requires the Idaho State Police to create a method for breath testing and
without a method ensuring extremely reliable results the results are not admissible.
LC. § 18-8004(4) states:
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For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be
based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven
(67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of
determining the alcohol concentration shall be perfonned by a laboratory operated
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police
under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by that
department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test
for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by
the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police
shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for
examination.
This statute must be strictly construed. As the Idaho Supreme Court in Sivak wrote:
Ordinarily, we must construe a statute to give effect to all of its parts, if we can,
and not construe it in a way that makes mere surplusage of one of its provisions.
However, there is another principle of statutory construction that must be
considered here. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. In Thompson, the
Court said: "This principle extends not only to the elements of the substantive
crime, but also to the sanctions potentially involved."

State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 324-25 (1990); citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 29, 153
(1989); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688,690 (1984) (overruled on other grounds,

Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166 (1990)); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,437
(1980); State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334, 338 (1957). Even if the result could be considered absurd,
Idaho statutory construction no longer considers absurdity of the result a ground for voiding or
changing a statute. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Med. Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895 (2011).
The strict construction rule is the rigid foundation of the rule oflaw. As the Supreme Court of
the United States found:
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Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled [sic] if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means * * *
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1967) quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438,485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
LC.§ 18-8004(4) unambiguously provides that the Idaho State Police shall create a
method for the analysis of breath and that the results of breath testing and that method will be
admissible despite any other law or court rule. The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously
considered what the result should be if the method is not faithfully complied with in State v. Bell,
115 Idaho 36 (Ct.App.1988) and its progeny. The Court in Bell held:
The pertinent language of LC.§ 18-8004(4), in effect at the time, stated:
Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining the alcohol
concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho
department of health and welfare or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho
department of health and welfare under the provisions of approval and
certification standards to be set by that department, .... [Emphasis added.] FN 3
FN3. "Analysis" as used in the quoted language of LC.§ 18-8004(4) refers only
to that part of the testing procedure which must be performed in an approved
laboratory. However, a critical part of the "analysis," in a broader sense, is the
first step of collecting a sample for testing. The collection of blood, urine or
breath samples obviously will not generally be made at an approved laboratory.
Nevertheless, because collection of samples is an essential part of analysis,
Department of Health and Welfare regulations extend to that activity and, for the
collection of blood, include descriptions of the proper collection instruments,
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antiseptics and chemical additives for preserving the sample in optimum condition
for testing.
The question then is whether, in the absence of an express exclusionary provision,
this language nevertheless requires exclusion of a test result where compliance
with the Health and Welfare testing requirements is not shown.
The admissibility of the result of a scientific test such as the blood-alcohol test in
LC. § 18-8004 turns normally on a foundation which establishes the acceptability,
validity, reliability and accuracy of the test and test procedures. In the admission
of a test result for alcohol concentration the Legislature has concluded that certain
foundational elements need not be presented at trial unless such elements are
disputed. The Legislature has acknowledged that certain tests, due to a history of
reliability and accuracy, are presumed to be valid and acceptable. This has also
been acknowledged by the courts. See State v. Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370
(Ct.App.1987) (holding that Intoximeter 3000 test result may be offered into
evidence without detailed foundation, but reliability of result may be challenged
by defendant).
The Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme which allows an expedient
method for admitting a blood-alcohol test result into evidence without the need
for some expert testimony. As provided by I.C. § 18-8004(4):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test
for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by
the Idaho department of health and welfare or by any other method approved by
health and welfare shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the
necessity of producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing
procedure for examination.
When this proposed statute was presented to the Legislature the statement of
purpose accompanying the legislation explained that expert witness testimony
was an unnecessary burden on the state. Such testimony, if used merely to
establish a foundation, provided superfluous verification of a test procedure which
the Legislature believed to produce an "extremely reliable" result.
Inherent in this statutory scheme, however, is an awareness by the Legislature of
the need for uniform test procedures. An "extremely reliable" test result can only
be the product of a test procedure which from previous use is known to be capable
of producing an accurate result. This benefit is best provided by strict adherence
to a uniform procedure. This was recognized by the Legislature and is apparent
first, from the statutory language which provides for the test procedure to be
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determined by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and second, by the
"shall" language mandating adherence to the standards set by that Department.
The acceptance by the Legislature of test procedures as designated by the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare does not wholly eliminate the need of
establishing foundational requirements for a test result. This is required even in
light of the legislative directive to utilize an expedient means to admit such
evidence. The adoption of the particular test procedure merely recognizes the
validity and reliability of that particular accepted test. It must still be established
at trial that those procedures which ensure the reliability and in tum the accuracy
of the test have been met. Absent such a showing, the expedient scheme adopted
by the Legislature fails to guarantee the admission of reliable evidence. Without
expert witness testimony to establish these necessary foundational elements,
compliance with the test procedure must be shown. We hold that to admit the test
result the state must provide adequate foundation evidence consisting either of
expert testimony or a showing that the test was administered in conformity with
the applicable test procedure. Of course, a test result, once admitted, still may be
attacked by the defendant. In that event, the trier of fact will determine the
ultimate weight to be given the test result.

Id. at 37-40. The Magistrate Court in this case seemingly broadened this holding to include the
current situation where no method exists. However, the Court in Bell was quite clear in finding
that the legislature had mandated that a method be created for breath testing. When the Idaho
State Police choose to violate this directive, it is clear that no breath test results will be
admissible. The lack of a uniform method creates a situation where the breath test results are
unreliable, just as the existence of such a method shields that method from criticism because its
constant, rigid application maintains its credibility.
The Court of Appeals recently ruled in State v. Besaw, 306 P .3d. 219 (Idaho
Ct.App.2013) that I.C. § 18-8004(4) merely required that the method be "capable" of producing
an accurate result. The Court's ruling is in error, both in that it overruled Bell without employing
the proper test, and in that it misinterprets the legislature's requirements for the executive.
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Fundamentally, no expert, however well trained, can ensure the reliability of a breath test result
done without a method. The rule of law cannot ignore the Rules of Scientific Procedure. The

laissez faire approach currently adopted by the Idaho State Police cannot ensure reliability to a
standard necessary for LC. § 18-8004(4) or the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution's due process protections. Jeremy Johnston, author of the SOPs, testified in this
case that he could not tell what the defendant's true BAC was on the basis of his tests. Tr. p. 47,
L. 5-6. How is it possible that such results are considered evidence? In what respect are they
more probative than prejudicial? This Court should find that the findings in Besaw were in error
and ovemde that case. Or, this Court should find that in this case, it has been shown that the
method is not capable of producing a demonstrably accurate result, and on the basis of Besaw,
reverse and remand.
Further, this Court should find that the SOPs have been modified so that the word "must"
has been replaced by the word "should" in the following instances:
1. The necessity to have the correct acceptable range limits and performance verification
standard lot number set in the instrument prior to evidentiary testing- 2.2.11 (1/15/2009)
cf. 5.2.10 (1/16/2013).
2. The need to monitor the subject for fifteen minutes prior to the test to ensure there is no
alcohol being regurgitated or in the mouth. See 3.1, 3.1.5, 3.1.5.l, 3.1.5.2 (1/15/2009) cf.
6.1, 6.1.4, 6.1.4.1, 6.1.4.2 (l /16/2013).

These changes occurred between the April 23, 2012 version of the SOPs and the installment
current at the time of the incident in the above-entitled matter.
Mouth alcohol is an enormous issue with breath testing. See Caddy, Sobell, and Sobell,
Alcohol Breath Tests: Criterion Times for Avoiding Contamination by 'Mouth Alcohol', 10(6)
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BEHAVIOR RESEARCH METHODS AND INSTRUMENTATION 814-18 (1978); Breath-Alchohol
Concentration May Not Always Reflect the Concentration of Alcohol in Blood, 18 J.
ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 225 (July/Aug. 1994); Colorado Department of Health, 6(11)
Drinking/Driving L. Letter 5 (May 29, 1987); Kechagias, Jonsson, Franzen, Andersson & Jones,
Reliability of Breath-Alcohol Analysis in Individuals with Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease,
44(4) J. FORENSIC SCIS. 814 (1999); Gaylard, Sambuk & Morgan, Reductions in Breath Ethanol
Readings in Normal Male Volunteers Following Mouth Rinsing with Water at Differing
Temperatures, 22 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 113 (1987); P. Price, Intoxilyzer: A Bread Testing
Device?, 15(4) Drinking/Driving L. Letter 52 (1996) (slope detector failures); Ethanol Content of
Various Foods and Soft Drinks and their Potential for Interference with a Breath-Alcohol Test,
22 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 181 (May/June 1998); Michael P. Hlastala, Ph.D., Wayne J.E.
Lamm, M.A. and James Nesci, J.D., The Slope Detector Does Not Always Detect the Presence
of Mouth Alcohol, THE CHAMPION, (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers), 57-60
(March 2006).

In addition to this, here, Jeremy Johnston, author of the SOPs, testified twice that the
fifteen minute observation period was necessary in a case such as this to know whether the
results were reliable. See Tr. p. 46, L. 19-21, p. 52, L. 16-17. Defense counsel cannot square this
testimony with the SOPs in use at the time of the incident in this matter.
This Court should find that the removal of this requirement renders the SOPs incapable of
ensuring accuracy.
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D. This Court should decide that no method exists.
Idaho Code 18-8004(4) mandates that testing for alcohol concentration be done in
accordance with methods approved by the Idaho State Police. In supposed compliance with that
mandate and authority, the Idaho State Police has issued both "Standard Operating Procedures:
Breath Alcohol Testing," ("SOP" or "SOPs") (available at
http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html) which purports to establish procedures for the
maintenance and operation of breath testing equipment as well as training and operations
manuals ("manual" or "manuals") (also available at
http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html) for the various breath testing devices, including
the LifeLoc FC20 device used in this case.
The ISP, by using SOPs in the place ofregulations, has made an end-run around the
requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, specifically LC.§§ 67-5220- 67-5232
and LD.A.P.A. 44.01. The ISP promulgated 11.03.01.014.03, which merely states that breath
tests shall be in conformity with standards established by the ISP. Thus, the various changes the
ISP makes to its breath testing procedures receive no public scrutiny prior to implementation,
which files in the face of what the legislature had in mind in passing LC.§ 18-8004(4). Under
the statutory definition, an agency action is a rule if it (1) is a statement of general applicability
and (2) implements, interprets, or prescribes existing law. See, Tomorrow's Hope, Inc. v. Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare, 124 Idaho 843, 846 (1993). The Idaho Supreme Court
considers the following characteristics of agency action indicative of a rule: (I) wide coverage,
(2) applied generally and uniformly, (3) operates only in future cases, (4) prescribes a legal
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standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute, (5) expresses agency policy
not previously expressed, and (6) is an interpretation oflaw or general policy. Asarco
Incorporated v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723 (2003). The standard operating procedures for

breathalyzer testing promulgated by the Idaho State Police easily fits this definition of a rule.
A comparison of the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis in Asarco with LC.§ 18-8004(4)
and the Idaho State Police's Standard Operating Procedures shows that the SOPs are rules that
fall under the IAP A.
1. The TMDL has wide coverage. The TMDL applies to all current and future

dischargers in a specific water body, in this case, the Coeur d'Alene River Basin.
Thus, the TMDL is accurately described by the trial court as applying to "a large
segment of the general public rather than an individual or narrow select group."
Asarco, 138 Idaho at 723. In this case, the SOPs apply to all breath testing that takes place in

the state ofldaho and thus to the entire driving population in the state. The scope of the SOPs
easily meets this requirement.
2. The TMDL is applied generally and uniformly. While the TMDL has
characteristics that are both generally applicable and discharger specific, the
TMDL, on the whole, is more appropriately described as generally applicable.

The TMDL, in part, constitutes a numerical limit or budget for a given water
body, based on the sum of the allowable pollution from all identified point source
and nonpoint sources of pollution, as well as natural background levels of the
pollutant. LC. § 39-3602(27); 40 CFR 130.2(i). These sums are based on
individual determinations, referred to as load allocations (LA's) and wasteload
allocations (WLA's). LA's are defined as the "portion of a receiving water's
loading capacity that is attributed either to one of its existing or future nonpoint
sources of pollution or to natural background sources." 40 CFR 130.2(g). The
wasteload allocations (WLA's) represent the "portion of a receiving water's
loading capacity that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources of
pollution." 40 CFR 130.2(h). The federal regulations further describe the WLA's
as "a type of water-quality based effluent limitation." Id. In addition, the EPA has
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used these individualized load allocations as enforceable limits modifying the
Mining Companies' NPDES permits accordingly. Thus, focusing on the LA and
WLA determinations alone, the TMDL process appears to be discharger specific.
Nevertheless, the individual LA and WLA determinations are just a small part of
the entire TMDL process. First, the TMDL considers the LA and WLA
allocations in sum in order to determine an over-all effluent limitation budget for
the identified water body. This budget applies to all existing and future point and
nonpoint source dischargers in a general and uniform manner. Second, the TMDL
process outlined by Idaho statute includes the following additional qualitative and
quantitative determinations:
(1) Identification of pollutants impacting the water body;
(2) An inventory of all point and nonpoint sources of the identified pollutant ... ;
(3) An analysis of why current control strategies are not effective in assuring full
support of designated beneficial uses;
(4) A plan to monitor and evaluate progress toward water quality progress and to
ascertain when designated beneficial uses will be fully supported;
(5) Pollution control strategies for both nonpoint and point sources for reducing
those sources of pollution;
(6) Identification of the period of time necessary to achieve full support of
designated beneficial uses; and

(7) An adequate margin of safety to account for uncertainty.
LC.§ 39-3611. Clearly these procedures are generally and uniformly applicable
and require DEQ to focus on the waterbody as a whole, as opposed to the
individual sources of pollution. Therefore, for the above reasons, even though the
TMDL involves determinations of specific applicability, the over-all scheme
demonstrates the TMDL is more appropriately described as generally and
uniformly applicable.

Id. at 723-34. The method required by LC.§ 18-8004(4) is intended by the legislature to act as
gatekeeper for the introduction of breath test results in DUI cases. LC.§ 18-8004(4) explicitly
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requires courts to allow the introduction of the breath test results as long as the method is
followed in spite of the rules of evidence. The procedures are meant to be "generally and
uniformly applicable" so as to guarantee accuracy. See Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation
Department, 148 Idaho 378, 387 (2009) (Wheeler, J. dissenting) citing Statement of Purpose, HB

284 (RS13389) (1987).
3. The TMDL Operates Only in Future Cases. The TMDL operates only
prospectively and does not adjudicate past actions by the Mining Companies or
any other party.
Id. at 724. The method that the Idaho State Police must adopt is not retroactive.
4. The TMDL Prescribes a Legal Standard Not Provided by the Enabling Statute.
As described above, the TMDL constitutes a numerical limit on the total
allowable discharge in a specified waterbody. This limit is allocated between
point sources and nonpoint sources of pollution. Even if DEQ does not intend to
enforce these limitations, and this Court is not determining whether or not it may
properly do so, EPA considers these numbers binding and has already used the
TMD L in order to reduce the discharge limits reflected in several of the Mining
Companies' NPDES permits. Thus, the TMDL in fact contains quantitative legal
standards not provided by either the Clean Water Act or the Idaho Water Quality
Act.

Id. The legislature requires the Idaho State Police to define a method. LC. § 18-8004(4). That
method creates a legal standard preventing the Court from requiring the state to provide an
expert to establish a reliable and accurate breath test. Id. Therefore, the method is a legal
standard not provided by LC.§ 18-8004(4).
5. The TMDL Expresses New Agency Policy. Even if the TMDL is nothing more
than a planning tool, as DEQ argues, it is an expression of agency policy not
previously addressed. This is true not only of the numerical limits contained in the
TMDL, but also the additional requirements contained in the Idaho Water Quality
Act, including (1) the analysis of why current control strategies are not effective
in assuring full support of designated beneficial uses; (2) the plan to monitor and
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evaluate progress toward water quality progress and to ascertain when designated
beneficial uses will be fully supported; and (3) the identification of pollution
control strategies for both nonpoint and point sources for reducing those sources
of pollution. J.C.§ 39-3611.
Id. at 724-25. The method adopted by the Idaho State Police in its Standard Operating
Procedures is policy inasmuch as it establishes requirements, parameters, and guidance for police
officers performing breath testing.
6. The TMDL Implements and Interprets Existing Law. While DEQ argues the
TMDL implements the water quality standards, which constitute a rule as opposed
to a law, the TMDL actually implements and interprets the directives contained in
both the Clean Water Act, as well as the more specific Idaho Water Quality Act.
The central problem with DEQ's argument is the state water quality standards do
not provide all of the information or direction necessary for promulgating a
TMDL. While the water quality standards serve as a basis for the TMDL
calculations, the TMDL requires much more. Under the Idaho Water Quality Act,
not only must DEQ identify the pollutants and inventory point and nonpoint
sources of pollution, the agency must also analyze why current control strategies
are not effective and develop new pollution control strategies for point and
nonpoint sources of pollution. LC. § 39-3611. In addition, the Idaho Water
Quality Act requires DEQ to allocate effluent limitations among point and
nonpoint sources of pollution and develop planning processes to monitor and
evaluate progress. Id. In making these types of decisions, DEQ is working far
outside the scope of the water quality standards alone and is both implementing
law and creating policy. Thus, DEQ's argument that the TMDL implements a rule
as opposed to a law is unpersuasive.
Id. Unlike in Asarco, there is no colorable argument that the Idaho State Police are not
implementing and interpreting LC. § 18-8004(4). The legislature required the ISP to adopt a
method that would act as a guarantor of admissibility in a criminal trial, and the ISP has
acknowledged that the SOPs are its attempt to do so. See IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03.
Further, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Wanner v. State Dept. o/Transp., 150
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Idaho 164 (Ct.App.2011), that hearings held per LC.§ 18-8002A are agency action controlled by
IDAP A. It is difficult to understand how the hearings provided are agency action but the
methods and rules required are not agency action falling under the requirements of ID APA.
Therefore, this Court must come to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court in Asarco:
In conclusion, the district court correctly determined the establishment of the
TMDL involved "rulemaking." Furthermore, because the TMDL is properly
considered a rule, it is invalid pursuant to the IAP A.
The IAPA provides, "[a] temporary or final rule adopted and becoming effective
after July 1, 1993, is voidable unless adopted in substantial compliance with the
requirements of this chapter." LC. § 67-5231. It is undisputed that DEQ did not
comply with formal rulemaking requirements. Rather than arguing it had
substantially complied with the rulemaking requirements, DEQ argued it did not
have to do so. Thus, the district court correctly held the TMDL is void for failure
to comply with state administrative law.
Asarco, 138 Idaho at 725. The ISP's SOPs are void. As such, no method exists and the ISP has

failed to comply with the legislature's requirements under LC. § 18-8004(4). Though the Court
of Appeals has held that where the method is not complied with an expert may be called to
establish reliability, where no method exists at all, reliability cannot be established. State v.
Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 73 7 (Ct.App.2011 ). This is both because the legislature has fixed the

admissibility requirements for breath tests and made them conditional on the existence of a
method, and because the Court cannot find reliability exists where the agency responsible for
establishing a method refuses to do so, ostensibly to take advantage of the fact that few
defendants can afford an expert and the ISP' s expert will be able to convince any court to
introduce the breath test results.
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The Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent is not to the contrary. The Court held in Bell that
the legislature had created a short form to introduce evidence by passing I.C. § 18-8004. The
Court found in State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99 (Ct.App.1991) that LR.E. 901(b)(10) allows the
legislature to determine a condition whereby evidence is authenticated, in that case, the
reliability of an Intoxilyzer 3000 breath testing machine. In both of those cases, the Court was
reviewing the administrative rules promulgated by the Idaho Department Health and Welfare. In

State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426 (Ct.App.1996), the Court for the first and only time encountered the
issue of whether "policy statements" could affect rights, but did not reach the issue because it
was not preserved below. In State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410-11 (Ct.App.1999), the Court
rejected the argument that I.C. § 18-8004 violated the separation of powers and I.R.E. 1102. The
Court in Nickerson with little explanation held that LC. § 18-8004 "specifies one means by
which the necessary foundation may be established ... " Id. at 411.

It is hard to understand how the Nickerson Court came to the conclusion that because I.C.
§ 18-8004 was not the sole foundation that could be laid for a breath test it did not violate the
separation of powers and I.R.E. 1102 in light of State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 540-41
(1985). The Supreme Court in Currington held that the legislature could not modify procedural
rules without violating the separation of powers. Moreover, the Court simply ignored the fact
that the legislature had given those powers to the executive, and so essentially the wolf had been
placed in charge of the hen house. The Court may have relied in part on the Supreme Court in

State v. Wilson, 116 Idaho 771, 773 (1989), which held that an Intoximeter with the Taguchi cell
deactivated had been properly approved by the Department of Health and Welfare. The Court
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found that LC.§ 18-8004(4) required that instruments be approved by the Department, and that
the Department's rules and regulations (16 IDAPA 02.7150.04(A) (1980)) provided that the
Department's bureau of laboratories must approve of the instrument. The Court found:
The "certification" of the Intoximeter by the bureau of laboratories of the
Department in 1981 stated that the Intoximeter was approved "in the
configuration specified by the supervisor of Blood and Alcohol testing of the
Forensic Section." In 1985, the supervising criminalist of forensic section of the
bureau of laboratories of the Department directed that the Taguchi cell on each
Intoximeter in service in Idaho be deactivated. This constituted the necessary
approval of the Department for use of the Intoximeter with the Taguchi cell
deactivated. No additional certification was required by LC. § 18-8004(4) or by
the rules and regulations of the Department.

Id. at 774. The Idaho Supreme Court had accepted that selection of devices for breath testing
may be done pursuant to IDAP A promulgated rules that vest discretion within branches of an
agency. However, the Court of Appeals held in State v. Alford, 139 Idaho 595 (2004), that the
selection of breath testing devices was not something with the force of law and did not require
rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to IDAP A. The Com1' s holding in Alford explains why
the Court in Wilson was unconcerned by the behavior of the Department in that case as
referenced by the dissent. See, Wilson, 116 Idaho at 774-787 (J. Bistline, dissenting). The
selection of which device the state uses to perform a breath test does not directly or substantially
affect the rights of third parties. However, the same certainly cannot be said for the legal test for
the foundation that must be laid to admit evidence in a criminal case.
And certainly none of these cases actually held that LC.§ 18-8004(4) allowed the
executive to determine what the legally sufficient foundation for evidence will be in a court of
law. In other states, the procedures for breath testing are set by statute. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 5- 26 -

C.G.S.A. 14-227a; 10 G.C.A. § 69202. Even Idaho requires a fifteen minute wait period
between breath samples for the Employer Alcohol and Drug-Free Workplace Act. See I.C. § 721704. The Idaho Court of Appeals has ruled, despite I.R.E. 1102, that the legislature may set the
procedure in Idaho for the foundational procedure for the introduction of breath samples in
criminal trials. The Court of Appeals has tacitly allowed that task to be delegated to the
executive. But the Court has never held that LC. § 18-8004(4) was a blank check to admit
evidence in criminal cases. It has never held that the ISP did not have to comply with IDAP A
before creating rules that would have the force and effect of law. And this Court must not do so
now.
To do otherwise would undo our legal system. There is nothing about DUI cases so
unique that the concept that the legislature may simply give the executive carte blanche to
determine what foundation is required for evidence will not spread to every type of case
imaginable. If this Court does not believe it surrendered power to the legislature in Nickerson, it
should review with a critical eye the legislature's wholesale provision of this branch's power to
the executive. Unless we are to be ruled by tyrants, the flow of powers from the judiciary to the
executive must stop.
The Magistrate Court improperly found that Besaw already controlled the outcome and
had found that the rules either do exist or that regardless of their existence the results of the
breath test would not be excluded. On the contrary, even under Besaw, a total lack of rules
would necessarily mean that the method cannot ensure a reliable result, and thus, the Magistrate
erred in denying the request to exclude the result. The District Court found that despite the fact
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that the executive was able to dictate a "short-form" foundation for the admissibility of evidence
at trial, that the "short-form" was not being given the force and effect of law. Perhaps if courts
were simply accepting the executive's test, it would be as the court describes it. But, since the
Court is finding that the Court is required to follow the short-form pursuant to law, the Court's
holding is absurd.
This Court should so hold and remand this case with instructions to exclude the breath
test results in this case.

III.
A. Introduction
The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress his breath test because a law providing for various penalties for relying on one's
constitutional rights is invalid, as is any consent provided after being warned of those penalties.
B. Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Button, 134 Idaho 814;

Powell, 130 Idaho at 125.
C. A valid consent cannot be produced after the Notice of Suspension for Failure of
Evidentiary Testing has been read to a citizen without the state first obtaining a warrant.

In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (U.S.Mo. 2013), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that an officer's belief that a person is currently intoxicated and need to
conduct an evidentiary test before the alcohol in their system evaporates does not per se create
exigent circumstances that allow the officer to forego seeking a warrant.
The state of Idaho, like the other forty-nine states, has adopted what is called an implied
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consent law. lvfcNeely, supra, at 1566-67. The Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Wulff, 157
Idaho 416 (2014), State v. Halseth, 339 P.3d 368 (2014), and State v. Arrotta, 339 P.3d 1177
(2014), that implied consent is revocable. The Idaho Supreme Court held in Halseth:
Considering the Court's action in Aviles and its reasoning and statements in
McNeely, we hold that an implied consent statute such as Washington's and
Idaho's does not justify a warrantless blood draw from a driver who refuses to
consent, as did Aviles, or objects to the blood draw, as did Defendant in this case.
Consent to a search must be voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,
232-33 (1973).
339 P.3d at 371. Thus, if one can refuse to consent without objecting to the test, "implied
consent" does not mean some consent exists that necessarily needs to be withdrawn by objection.
The Idaho Supreme Court held in Wuif.f that:
[b ]ecause McNeely prohibits per se exceptions to the warrant requirement and the
district court correctly understood Idaho's implied consent statute operated as a
per se exception, Idaho's implied consent statute does not fall under the consent
exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, we
overrule Diaz and Woolery to the extent that they applied Idaho's implied consent
statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutionally allowed forced
warrantless blood draws. We hold the district court properly concluded that
Idaho's implied consent statute was not a valid exception to the warrant
requirement.
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 582 citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho

368 (1989).
This Court is now confronted with whether consent to evidentiary testing that is
"implied" by driving on the roads of Idaho is "freely" revocable. The Idaho Supreme Court
held:
Finally, irrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rule that cannot fit under
the consent exception because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that
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consent. Voluntariness has always been analyzed under the totality of the
circumstances approach: "whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' ...
is a question of fact to be detem1ined from the totality of all the circumstances."
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973). Further, the State has the burden to prove that "consent was, in fact, freely
and voluntarily given." Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. N Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,
548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968)). Consent is not voluntary if it is "the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
When the Court has determined whether a suspect's consent was voluntary or
coerced, its decisions "each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding
circumstances" and "none of them turned on the presence or absence of a single
controlling criterion." Id. at 226. The Court has also stated
The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and
seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable. Thus, we have long
approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to
conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so. The standard for
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of
"objective" reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297
(1991) (internal citations omitted). Given that "[t]he touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness," id. at 250, and that the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized a totality of the circumstances approach is
necessary to determine voluntariness for consent, requiring a totality of the
circumstances approach to determine a driver's consent fits within the Court's
existing precedent.
Analyzing consent under a totality of the circumstances approach considers
whether a person could change his mind and revoke his consent. A holding that
the consent implied by statute is irrevocable would be utterly inconsistent with the
language in McNeely denouncing categorical rules that allow warrantless forced
blood draws. This is why the district court remarked that "implied consent statutes
would have the effect of making the McNeely decision of little or no
consequence."

Wulff, 157 Idaho at 581-82. Thus, the Supreme Court held that a totality of the circumstances
must be considered, including whether a person could change their mind and revoke consent.
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This Court is asked to find that the ability to do so is clearly hampered when one is confront with
penalties for a revocation.
This Court must determine the validity of consent after a person has been read the Notice
of Suspension for Failure ofEvidentiary Testing (otherwise known as the ALS form) as it was at
the time of this incident. This form is read by Idaho police to defendants and states:
I have reasonable grounds to believe that you were driving or were
in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances. You are required
by law to take one or more evidentiary test(s) to determine the
concentration of alcohol or presence of drugs or other intoxicating
substances in your body. After submitting to the test(s) you may,
when practical, at your own expense, have additional test(s) made
by a person of your own choosing. You do not have the right to
talk to a lawyer before taking any evidentiary test(s) to determine
the alcohol concentration or presence of drugs or other intoxicating
substances in your body. [emphasis added].
The form goes on to list a litany of punishments that will result if a person refuses. The form is
based on the requirements ofl.C. § 18-8002. The obvious problem with this warning is that the
law requiring those tests is unconstitutional until the officer has secured a warrant or has a valid
exception to the warrant requirement. It improperly informs the defendant that they are
"required" to take an evidentiary test. It then threatens the person if they dare refuse. These
punishments are clearly intended to and do coerce citizens into taking a test. See, State v. Brooks,
838 N.W.2d 563, 573-74 (Minn. 2013) (Stras, J., concurring), cert. denied, --- U.S.---, 133 S.Ct.
1585 (2013).
A state may not pass a law that visits penalties upon a citizen for exercising a
constitutional right. See Camara v. Municipal Court of the City And County ofSan Francisco,
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387 U.S. 523, 531-534 (1967) (striking down laws that allow for fines when individuals refuse to
consent to warrantless searches of their dwellings); Columbia Basin Apartment Association v.

City of Pasco, 268 F.2d 791, 797-798 (9th.Cir.2001) (plaintiff tenants have standing to challenge
ordinance requiring tenants to allow warrantless searches of their homes or face eviction);

Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 346 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1976) (striking down ordinance requiring
seller of a house to consent to a warrantless search or face a fine between $5 and $500 because it
coerced a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights). An officer may not threaten to do what he is not
legally or constitutionally authorized to do. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-550
(1968); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488-89 (2007). The policeman's threat vitiates any
consent. Id.
In this case, the defendant was read the ALS form. Therefore, his consent was
involuntary and the result of the test must be excluded under the Idaho Constitution Article I§
17. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,995 (1992).
CONCLUSION
The case before this Court requires it to determine how far the state may go in violating a
citizen's rights to prove a charge of Driving under the Influence. This Court should reverse the
lower Court's denial of the Motion to Suppress the breath test, and/or the Motion in Limine, and
remand for further proceedings, including a requirement that the defendant be allowed to
withdraw his plea. If the Court does not reverse those motions, then the Court should reverse the
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denial of the request for expert assistance, and remand for further proceedings, including a
requirement that the defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea.
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